الباب التاسع عشر في القدرة
Chapter Nineteen: On Power (al-Qudra)
§2 القدرةُ قوةٌ ذاتية، لا تكون إلاَّ لله. وشأنُها إبرازُ المعلومات إلى العالم العيني، على المقتضى العلمي. فهو مجلى تجلٍّ -- أي مظهرُ أعيانِ معلوماته الموجودة من العدم -- لأنه يعلمها موجودةً من عدمٍ في علمه.
Power (al-qudra) is an essential force, [which] is for none but God. And its [characteristic] affair is the bringing-forth of the known-objects to the concrete world, upon the requirement of the knowledge. So it is a disclosure-site of self-disclosure -- that is, a locus-of-manifestation for the entities of His known-objects, existent from non-existence -- because He knows them [to be] existent from non-existence, in His knowledge.
glossary: tajalli
§3 فالقدرةُ هي القوةُ البارزةُ للموجودات من العدم. وهي صفةٌ نفسية، بها ظهرت الربوبية. وهي -- أعني القدرة -- عينُ القدرة الموجودة فينا. فنسبتُها إلينا تُسمّى قدرةً حادثة، ونسبتُها إلى الله تعالى تُسمّى قدرةً قديمة. والقدرةُ في نسبتها إلينا عاجزةٌ عن الاختراعات، وهي بعينها في نسبتها إلى الله تعالى تخترع الأشياء، وتبرزها من كتم العدم إلى شهود الوجود. فافهم ذلك،
So Power is the force that brings forth the existents from non-existence. And it is a self-related attribute, by which Lordship appeared. And it -- I mean Power -- is the very [reality of] the power found in us. So its ascription to us is named 'an originated power,' and its ascription to God (exalted is He) is named 'a pre-eternal power.' And Power, in its ascription to us, is incapable of inventions; while it itself, in its ascription to God (exalted is He), invents the things, and brings them forth from the concealment of non-existence to the witnessing of existence. So understand that --
The same logic as Bāb 18 (Will): the one divine Power is 'created' only in respect of its ascription to us (where it is 'incapable of inventions'), and pre-eternal and creative in respect of its ascription to God. The attribute is one; the difference is in the ascription.
§4 فإنه سرٌّ جليلٌ، لا يصلح كشفُه إلاَّ للذاتيين من أهل الله تعالى.
for it is a noble secret, whose unveiling is not fitting except for the people of the Essence (al-dhātiyyīn), of the people of God (exalted is He).
§5 والقدرةُ عندنا إيجادُ المعدوم -- خلافاً للإمام محيي الدين بن العربي، فإنه قال: إن الله لم يخلق الأشياء من العدم، وإنما أبرزها من وجودٍ علميٍّ إلى وجودٍ عيني. وهذا الكلامُ، وإن كان له في العقل وجهٌ يستند إليه على ضعف، فأنا أُنزّه ربي أن أُعجز قدرتَه عن اختراع المعدوم، وإبرازه من العدم المحض إلى الوجود المحض.
And Power, with us, is the bringing-into-existence of the non-existent -- contrary to the Imam Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī; for he said: that God did not create the things from non-existence, but rather brought them forth from an existence-in-knowledge to an existence-in-the-concrete. And this statement -- even though it has, in the intellect, an aspect to lean upon, [though] weakly -- [yet] I declare my Lord transcendent above [the suggestion] that I should make His power incapable of inventing the non-existent, and bringing it forth from pure non-existence to pure existence.
The THIRD consecutive explicit correction of Ibn al-ʿArabī (after the independence of divine knowledge, Bāb 17 §11, and divine free-choice, Bāb 18 §35) -- here on creation. Ibn al-ʿArabī, on the doctrine of the fixed entities, held that creation is not from nothing but the externalization of what eternally subsists in God's knowledge. al-Jīlī affirms genuine creatio ex nihilo (from al-ʿadam al-maḥḍ, 'pure non-existence'), declaring it would impugn God's omnipotence to make Him unable to create the non-existent from pure nothing. The three corrections together defend divine transcendence and omnipotence against the necessitarian/immanentist drift of the aʿyān-thābita doctrine.
§6 واعلم أن ما قاله الإمامُ محيي الدين رضي الله عنه غيرُ منكور، لأنه أراد بذلك وجودَ الأشياء في علمه أولاً.
And know that what the Imam Muḥyī al-Dīn (may God be pleased with him) said is not [to be] denied -- because he intended, by that, the existence of the things in His knowledge, first.
§7 ثم لما أبرزها إلى العيني، كان هذا الإبرازُ من وجودٍ علميٍّ إلى وجودٍ عيني. وفاته أن حكمَ الوجود لله تعالى -- في نفسه -- قبل حكم وجودٍ لها في علمه.
Then, when He brought them forth to the concrete, this bringing-forth was from an existence-in-knowledge to an existence-in-the-concrete. And it escaped him that the rule of existence belonging to God (exalted is He) -- in Himself -- is before the rule of [any] existence for them in His knowledge.
§8 فالموجوداتُ معدومةٌ في ذلك الحكم، ولا وجودَ فيه إلاَّ لله تعالى وحده. وبهذا صحّ له القِدَم. وإلاَّ، لزم أن تسايره الموجوداتُ في قِدَمه على كل وجه -- ويتعالى عن ذلك.
So the existents are non-existent in that rule, and there is no existence in it except for God (exalted is He) alone. And by this, pre-eternity is valid for Him. Otherwise, it would follow that the existents accompany Him in His pre-eternity in every respect -- and He is exalted above that.
al-Jīlī's decisive reason: if the things had a real (even knowledge-) existence not preceded by non-existence, they would be co-eternal with God 'in every respect,' compromising His unique pre-eternity. Hence even their existence-in-knowledge must be 'from pure non-existence' (§9): the things are non-existent relative to God's own prior existence-for-Himself.
§9 فتحصَّل من هذا أنه أوجدها في علمه من عدمٍ -- يعني أنه يعلمها في علمه موجودةً من عدم، فليُتأمّل -- ثم أوجدها في العين بإبرازها من العلم. وهي في أصلها موجودةٌ في العلم من العدم المحض. فما أوجد الأشياء سبحانه وتعالى إلاَّ من العدم المحض.
So it results, from this, that He brought them into existence, in His knowledge, from non-existence -- meaning, He knows them, in His knowledge, [to be] existent from non-existence (so let it be pondered) -- then He brought them into existence, in the concrete, by bringing them forth from the knowledge. And they are, in their root, existent in the knowledge from pure non-existence. So He (glory be to Him, exalted is He) did not bring the things into existence except from pure non-existence.
§10 واعلم أن علمَ الحق سبحانه وتعالى لنفسه، وعلمَه لمخلوقاته، علمٌ واحد. فبنفس علمه بذاته يعلم مخلوقاته. لكنها غيرُ قديمةٍ بقِدَمه، لأنه يعلم مخلوقاته بالحدوث. فهي في علمه محدثةُ الحكم في نفسها، مسبوقةٌ بالعدم في عينها.
And know that the knowledge of the Real (glory be to Him, exalted is He) of Himself, and His knowledge of His creatures, is one knowledge. So by the very knowledge of His Essence He knows His creatures. But they are not pre-eternal by His pre-eternity, because He knows His creatures by [their] origination. So they are, in His knowledge, originated-of-rule in themselves, preceded by non-existence in their entities.
glossary: dhat
§11 وعلمُه قديمٌ، غيرُ مسبوقٍ بالعدم. وقولُنا 'حكمُ الوجود له قبل حكم الوجود لها' -- فإن القَبليّة قَبليّةٌ حكميةٌ أصلية، لا زمانية -- لأنه سبحانه وتعالى له الوجودُ الأول، لاستقلاله بنفسه؛ والمخلوقاتُ لها الوجودُ الثاني، لاحتياجها إليه.
And His knowledge is pre-eternal, not preceded by non-existence. And our saying 'the rule of existence is His before the rule of existence for them' -- the before-ness [here] is a before-ness of rule, original, not temporal -- because He (glory be to Him, exalted is He) has the first existence, on account of His self-subsistence; and the creatures have the second existence, on account of their need of Him.
The 'before-ness of rule, not of time' is the same precision al-Jīlī used of the ʿamāʾ hadith (Bāb 9 §33): God's priority over the creatures is ontological/logical, not temporal, since time itself is created. The witness's 'fāt al-qābiliyya' is an OCR garble for 'fa-inna al-qabliyya,' restored.
§12 فالمخلوقاتُ معدومةٌ في وجوده الأول. فهو سبحانه أوجد من العلم المحض في علمه، اختراعاً إلهياً.
So the creatures are non-existent in His first existence. So He (glory be to Him) brought [them] into existence, from pure knowledge, in His knowledge -- [by] a divine invention.
§13 ثم أبرزها من العالم العلمي إلى العالم العيني بقدرته. وإيجادُه للمخلوقات إيجادٌ من العدم إلى العين. لا سبيل إلى غير هذا.
Then He brought them forth, from the knowledge-world to the concrete-world, by His power. And His bringing-of-the-creatures into existence is a bringing-into-existence from non-existence to the concrete. There is no way to other than this.
§14 ولا يُقال: يلزم من هذا جهلُه بها قبل إيجادها في علمه -- إذ ما ثَمَّ زمان، وما ثَمَّ إلاَّ قَبليّةٌ حكمية، أوجبتها الألوهيةُ، لعزّتها بنفسها، واستغنائها في أوصافها عن العالمين.
And it is not said: it follows from this [that there was] His ignorance of them, before His bringing them into existence in His knowledge -- since there is no time [there], and there is nothing [there] but a before-ness of rule, which Divinity necessitated, for its self-might, and its self-sufficiency, in its qualities, [independent] of the worlds.
al-Jīlī guards his ex-nihilo doctrine against the objection that it would make God ignorant of the things 'before' creating them in His knowledge: there is no 'before' in time, only a before-ness of rule -- and that very independence is required by God's self-sufficiency 'in His qualities, independent of the worlds' (the same principle as Bāb 17 §18).
§15 فليس بين وجودها في علمه، وبين عدمها الأصلي، زمانٌ، فيُقال: إنه كان يجهلها قبل إيجادها في علمه. تعالى الله عن ذلك علوّاً كبيراً، فافهم.
For there is not, between their existence in His knowledge and their original non-existence, [any] time, that one should say: 'He was ignorant of them, before His bringing them into existence in His knowledge.' Exalted is God above that, a great exaltation! So understand.
§16 فإن الكشفَ الإلهي أعطانا ذلك من نفسه. وما أوردناه في كتابنا إلاَّ ليقع التنبيهُ عليه، نصيحةً لله تعالى، ولرسوله، وللمؤمنين. ولا اعتراضَ على الإمام، إذ هو مصيبٌ في قوله، على الحدّ الذي ذكرناه؛ ولو كان مخطئاً على الحكم الذي بيّناه. {وَفَوْقَ كُلِّ ذِي عِلْمٍ عَلِيمٌ} [يوسف: 76].
For the divine unveiling gave us that, of itself. And we have brought it up, in our book, only that the calling-of-attention to it might occur -- [as] sincere counsel to God (exalted is He), and to His Messenger, and to the believers. And [there is] no objection [intended] against the Imam, since he is correct in his statement, upon the level that we [first] mentioned; even if [he were] erroneous upon the ruling that we [then] explained. 'And above every possessor of knowledge is a Knower' (12:76, Yūsuf).
Qurʾān 12:76: Yūsuf 12:76, the closing clause 'wa-fawqa kulli dhī ʿilmin ʿalīm' glossary: kashf The model of al-Jīlī's intra-Akbarian disagreement, and the irenic seal of all three corrections (Bāb 17-19): he frames the whole as 'sincere counsel' (al-naṣīḥa -- echoing the sound hadith 'the religion is sincere counsel, to God, His Messenger, and the believers,' Muslim), insists there is 'no objection against the Imam' (who is 'correct on the level we mentioned'), and closes with humility -- 'above every possessor of knowledge is a Knower.' He corrects his master without disrespect, and submits even his own correction to a higher Knower.
§17 فإذا علمت هذا، فإن القدرة الإلهية صفةٌ، بثبوتها انتفى عنه العجزُ، بكل حالٍ، وعلى كل وجه. لا يلزم من قولنا 'بثبوتها انتفى عنه العجز' أن يُقال: لو لم تثبت، لثبت العجز -- فإنها ثابتةٌ، لا يجوز فيها تقديرُ عدم الثبوت. فهي ثابتةٌ أبداً، والعجزُ منتفٍ أبداً، فافهم.
So when you have known this, [then know that] the divine Power is an attribute by whose establishment incapacity is negated from Him, in every state and in every respect. It does not follow, from our saying 'by its establishment incapacity is negated,' that one should say: 'Had it not been established, incapacity would be established' -- for it is established, [and] the supposition of [its] non-establishment is not permissible in it. So it is established forever, and incapacity [is] negated forever. So understand.
A closing logical refinement: Power's establishment negates incapacity, but one may not infer the counterfactual 'had Power not been established, incapacity would be' -- because the non-establishment of a necessary divine attribute is not even a permissible supposition. The negation of incapacity is unconditional, not contingent on a possible alternative.
Collation. Two-witness collated, staged 2026-06-03. Bāb 19 of the foundational opening band (al-Qudra, Power) -- the fourth of the dedicated attribute-chapters. Witness-2 (ibnalarabi.com id=22) clean of navigation chrome; the trailing site-search widget EXCLUDED. No embedded poem. Doctrinally notable for the THIRD consecutive explicit correction of Ibn al-ʿArabī (after knowledge in Bāb 17 and free-choice in Bāb 18) -- here on creatio ex nihilo: al-Jīlī affirms God creates from PURE non-existence (al-ʿadam al-maḥḍ), against Ibn al-ʿArabī's view that creation is only the externalization of what already exists in divine knowledge. The correction is unusually irenic (§16): al-Jīlī grants Ibn al-ʿArabī is 'correct on the level we mentioned,' frames the whole as 'sincere counsel,' and closes with 'above every possessor of knowledge is a Knower.' A few OCR garbles restored ('fāt al-qābiliyya' → 'fa-inna al-qabliyya' at §11; several kāf-as-alif). No lossy drop of authorial prose.
Qurʾān. One Qurʾān locus verified verbatim against alquran.cloud, tag correct: Yūsuf 12:76, the closing clause 'wa-fawqa kulli dhī ʿilmin ʿalīm' (§16, with which al-Jīlī humbly seals his disagreement with his master). Allusion noted: the ḥadīth 'the religion is sincere counsel (al-naṣīḥa) -- to God, His Messenger, and the believers' (§16, sound, Muslim). No other citations; no embedded poem.