al-Insān al-Kāmil, Bāb 17 -- Knowledge
full parallel manuscript · complete bitext
الإنسان الكامل · الباب السابع عشر في العلم
The seventeenth chapter of al-Insān al-Kāmil, rendered as a full parallel manuscript: every segment, aligned line by line. The second of the dedicated attribute-chapters, it treats Knowledge — “a self-related, pre-eternal attribute,” one undivided knowledge by which God knows both Himself and His creation. From there it ranges over the grammar of the divine names of knowing (al-ʿAlīm, al-ʿĀlim, al-ʿAllām), the thesis that Knowledge is the nearest attribute to Life as Life is the nearest to the Essence, a reading of the Qurʾanic “dead given life” verse as knowledge driving out ignorance, the independence of each divine attribute, the human as a copy of every attribute of the All-Merciful, and the imaginal world as the inner dominion-realm (malakūt) of which the sensible world is a copy. It closes with a sea-poem of annihilation.
Editorial note. The most striking thing in this chapter is intellectual-historical: al-Jīlī here openly corrects his own master, Ibn al-ʿArabī, by name and with full honorifics (§11-20). At issue is the doctrine of the fixed entities (al-aʿyān al-thābita): Ibn al-ʿArabī’s well-known formula that “the objects of God’s knowledge give God knowledge of themselves” — the eternal natures of things determining the content of what God knows. al-Jīlī judges that this, taken at face value, would make God’s knowledge depend on the creatures and so compromise His self-sufficiency (“independent of the worlds,” 3:97 / 29:6); he therefore says his master “slipped,” excuses him (“let us not say that is the full reach of his knowledge”), and offers the correction: God knows the things by “an original knowledge from Himself,” before their creation, and what looks like the objects “giving” Him knowledge is really His secondary ruling, confirming them as what His prior knowledge already knew them to be. This is a model of respectful disagreement within the Akbarian school, and clear evidence that al-Jīlī is an independent thinker, not a mere transmitter. The chapter’s other notable moves — the play on kāfir as “coverer” of God’s existence; the human as the copy of every divine attribute through whom even the “impossible” gains imaginal existence; and the malakūt/mulk cosmology of the imaginal world — are recorded in al-Jīlī’s voice and framed against the mainstream. A second-reader pass is advisable.
الباب السابع عشر في العلم
Chapter Seventeen: On Knowledge (al-ʿIlm)
العلمُ دَركُ الحقِّ للأشياءِ ....... لو أنه من وجهِه بفناءِ
Knowledge is the Real's apprehending of the things -- / [even] were it [the thing], on its [own] side, in [a state of] annihilation.
لكنها الاسمُ العليمُ لمُدرِكٍ ....... أمرَ الوجودِ بشرطِ الاستيفاءِ
But it [knowledge] is the name 'the Knower,' for One apprehending / the affair of existence, on condition of [its] exhausting [/completeness].
فيكون علاّمَ القديمِ، وعالماً ....... للمحدثاتِ، بغيرِ ما إخفاءِ
So He is the All-Knower of the Pre-eternal, and the Knower / of the originated [things], without [any] hiding.
وحقيقةُ العلمِ المقدّسِ واحدٌ ....... من غيرِ ما كلٍّ ولا أجزاءِ
And the reality of the hallowed Knowledge is one, / without [any] whole and no parts.
هو مُجمَلٌ في الغيبِ، وهو مفصَّلٌ ....... في عالمِ المشهودِ والإيماءِ
It is summary in the unseen, and it is detailed / in the world of the witnessed and the [signified by] gesture.
لكن جملتُه هناك، فقد حوى ....... التفصيلَ تحقيقاً بغيرِ مِراءِ
But its summary [is] there -- yet it has comprehended / the detail, [as] a verification, without dispute.
وبه فتعلمُ ذاتُه خلاّقَنا ....... وبه فيعلمُنا عن الأهواءِ
And by it His Essence knows our being-created; / and by it He knows us, [apart] from the caprices.
وبه فنعلمُه، ونعلمُ ذاتَنا ....... فاعجبْ لفردٍ جامعِ الأشياءِ
And by it we know Him, and we know our [own] essence. / So wonder at a Single [reality] that gathers [all] the things!
كعلمِ أن العلمَ صفةٌ نفسيةٌ أزلية. فعلمُه سبحانه وتعالى بنفسه، وعلمُه بخلقه، علمٌ واحد، غيرُ منقسم، ولا متعدد. ولكنه يعلم نفسه بما هو له، ويعلم خلقه بما هم عليه.
[Know,] as is [rightly] known, that Knowledge is a self-related, pre-eternal attribute. So His knowledge (glory be to Him, exalted is He) of Himself, and His knowledge of His creation, is one knowledge, undivided and unmultiplied. But He knows Himself by what is His, and He knows His creation by what they are upon.
ولا يجوز أن يقال: إن المعلوماتِ أعطته العلمَ من نفسها، لئلا يلزم من ذلك كونُه استفاد شيئاً من غيره. ولقد سها الإمامُ محيي الدين بن العربي رضي الله عنه، حيث قال: إن معلوماتِ الحقِّ أعطت الحقَّ العلمَ من نفسها. فلنعذره، ولا نقول إن ذلك مَبلغُ علمه.
And it is not permissible to say that the known-objects gave Him the knowledge from themselves -- lest it follow, from that, that He gained something from another. And the Imam Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī (may God be pleased with him) [did] slip, when he said: that the known-objects of the Real gave the Real the knowledge from themselves. So let us excuse him, and let us not say that that is the [full] reach of his knowledge.
A rare and significant moment: al-Jīlī explicitly corrects his own master, Ibn al-ʿArabī, naming him with full honorifics and saying he 'slipped' (sahā). At issue is the doctrine of the fixed entities (al-aʿyān al-thābita): Ibn al-ʿArabī's formula that 'the objects of God's knowledge give God knowledge of themselves' (the things, by their eternal natures, determining the content of what God knows). al-Jīlī judges this to imply that God 'gained something from another,' compromising His self-sufficiency, and offers the correction of §12-20. He excuses his master ('let us not say that is the full reach of his knowledge') -- a model of respectful disagreement within the Akbarian school, and evidence that al-Jīlī is an independent thinker, not a mere follower.
ولكنا وجدناه سبحانه وتعالى -- بعد هذا -- يعلمها بعلمٍ أصليٍّ منه، غيرِ مستفادٍ مما عليه المعلوماتُ، فيما اقتضته من نفسها بحسب حقائقها. غيرَ أنها اقتضت في نفسها ما علمه سبحانه منها، فحكم لها ثانياً بما اقتضته، وهو حكمُها عليه.
But we found Him (glory be to Him, exalted is He) -- after this -- knowing them by an original knowledge from Himself, not gained from what the known-objects are upon, of what they required of themselves according to their realities. Except that they required, in themselves, [only] what He (glory be to Him) [already] knew of them; so He ruled, for them, secondly, by what they required -- and that is their 'ruling upon Him.'
al-Jīlī's correction: God knows the things by 'an original knowledge from Himself,' not derived from them. What looks like the objects 'giving' Him knowledge is really His SECONDARY ruling, in which He confirms them as what His prior, original knowledge already knew them to be. The objects 'require' (iqtiḍāʾ) what He eternally knew; they do not inform Him.
ولما رأى الإمامُ المذكورُ رضي الله عنه أن الحقَّ حكم للمعلوماتِ بما اقتضته من نفسها، ظنّ أن علمَ الحقِّ مستفادٌ من اقتضاء المعلومات، فقال:
And when the mentioned Imam (may God be pleased with him) saw that the Real ruled, for the known-objects, by what they required of themselves, he supposed that the knowledge of the Real is gained from the requirement of the known-objects; so he said:
إن المعلوماتِ أعطت الحقَّ العلمَ من نفسها. وفاته أنه إنما اقتضت ما علمها عليه، بالعلم الكليِّ الأصليِّ النفسيِّ، قبل خلقها وإيجادها.
that the known-objects gave the Real the knowledge from themselves. And it escaped him that they required only what He [already] knew them [to be] upon -- by the universal, original, self-related knowledge -- before their creation and their bringing-into-existence.
فإنها ما تعيّنت في العلم الإلهي إلاَّ بما علمها، وإلاَّ بما اقتضته ذواتها.
For they were not individuated in the divine knowledge except by what He knew them [to be], and except by what their essences required.
The fixed entities (al-aʿyān al-thābita) are individuated in the divine knowledge by their own essences -- but, al-Jīlī insists, God's knowledge of them is His own, original, and pre-eternal, 'before their creation,' not generated by them. The point distinguishes the eternal natures of things (which determine what they are) from the SOURCE of God's knowing (which is Himself).
ثم اقتضت بعد ذلك من نفسها أموراً -- يعني غيرَ ما علمها عليه أولاً --
Then they required, after that, of themselves, [certain] matters -- meaning, other than what He [first] knew them [to be] upon --
فحكم لها ثانياً بما اقتضته، وما حكم لها إلاَّ بما علمها عليه.
so He ruled, for them, secondly, by what they required; and He ruled for them only by what He [already] knew them [to be] upon.
فتأمّل، فإنها مسألةٌ لطيفة. ولو لم يكن الأمرُ كذلك، لم يصحّ له من نفسه الغِنى عن العالمين.
So ponder, for it is a subtle question. And were the matter not so, His self-sufficiency (al-ghinā), from Himself, [independent] of the worlds, would not be valid for Him.
al-Jīlī's theological reason for correcting Ibn al-ʿArabī: God is 'self-sufficient, independent of the worlds' (al-ghaniyy ʿan al-ʿālamīn, Āl ʿImrān 3:97 / al-ʿAnkabūt 29:6). If His knowledge depended on the creatures (as Ibn al-ʿArabī's formula seems to make it), His self-sufficiency would fail. Independence of the divine knowledge is required by divine self-sufficiency.
لأنه إذا كانت المعلوماتُ أعطته العلمَ من نفسها، فقد توقّف حصولُ العلم له على المعلومات. ومن توقّف وصفُه على شيءٍ، كان مفتقراً إلى ذلك الشيء في ذلك الوصف.
Because, if the known-objects gave Him the knowledge from themselves, [then] the obtaining of the knowledge, for Him, [would] depend upon the known-objects; and whoever's quality depends upon a thing is in need of that thing in that quality.
ووصفُ العلمِ له وصفٌ نفسيٌّ، فكان يلزم من هذا أن يكون في نفسه مفتقراً إلى شيءٍ. تعالى عن ذلك علوّاً كبيراً.
And the quality of Knowledge, for Him, is a self-related quality; so it would follow, from this, that He should be, in Himself, in need of [some]thing. Exalted is He above that, a great exaltation!
فيُسمّى الحقُّ عليماً، بنسبة العلم إليه مطلقاً؛ ويُسمّى عالماً، بنسبة معلومية الأشياء إليه؛ ويُسمّى علاّماً، بنسبة العلم ومعلومية الأشياء له معاً. فالعليمُ اسمُ صفةٍ نفسية، لعدم النظر فيه إلى شيءٍ مما سواه.
So the Real is named 'the Knower' (al-ʿAlīm), by the relation of the knowledge to Him absolutely; and He is named 'the Knowing-One' (al-ʿĀlim), by the relation of the known-ness of the things to Him; and He is named 'the All-Knower' (al-ʿAllām), by the relation of [both] the knowledge and the known-ness of the things to Him together. So 'al-ʿAlīm' is the name of a self-related attribute, for the absence of [any] regard, in it, to anything other than Him.
إذ العلمُ ما تستحقه النفسُ في كمالها لذاتها.
since Knowledge is what the Self deserves, in its perfection, for its [own] essence.
وكذلك العالِمُ، فاسمُ صفةٍ فعلية، وذلك علمُه للأشياء، سواء كان علمَه لنفسه أو بغيره.
And likewise 'al-ʿĀlim' (the Knowing-One): it is the name of an act-related attribute -- and that is His knowledge of the things, whether it be His knowledge of Himself or of another.
وأنها فعلية، لأنك تقول: عالِمٌ بنفسه -- يعني عَلِمَ نفسه -- وعالِمٌ بغيره -- يعني علم غيره -- ولا بد أن تكون صفةً فعلية.
And [the proof] that it [al-ʿĀlim] is act-related is that you say: 'knowing of himself' -- meaning, he knew himself -- and 'knowing of another' -- meaning, he knew another -- and it must [therefore] be an act-related attribute.
وكذلك العلاّمُ، فبالنظر إلى النسبة العلمية، اسمُ صفةٍ نفسية، كالعليم؛ وبالنظر إلى نسبة معلومية الأشياء له، فاسمُ صفةٍ فعلية. ولهذا غلب وصفُ الخلق باسم العالِم، دون العليم والعلاّم.
And likewise 'al-ʿAllām' (the All-Knower): by regard to the relation of knowledge, it is the name of a self-related attribute, like al-ʿAlīm; and by regard to the relation of the known-ness of the things to him, it is the name of an act-related attribute. And for this, the describing of the creation by the name 'al-ʿĀlim' (knowing) prevailed, rather than 'al-ʿAlīm' and 'al-ʿAllām.'
فيُقال: فلانٌ عالِمٌ، ولا يُقال: عليمٌ ولا علاّمٌ مطلقاً. اللهم إلاَّ إن قُيِّد، فيُقال: فلانٌ عليمٌ بأمر كذا. وأما 'علاّمٌ' فلم يَرِد بأمرٍ كذا، ولا 'علاّمٌ' مطلقاً. فإن وُصف شخصٌ بذلك، فلا بد من التقييد، فيُقال: فلانٌ علاّمٌ في فنّ كذا -- وهذا على سبيل التوسّع والتجوّز. وليس قولُهم: فلانٌ علاّمةٌ، من هذا القبيل، لأن ذلك ليس باسم الله، فلا يجوز أن يُقال: إن الله علاّمةٌ، فافهم.
So it is said: 'So-and-so is knowing (ʿālim),' and it is not said 'ʿalīm' or 'ʿallām' absolutely [of a human]. Unless, [that is,] it be restricted -- so it is said: 'So-and-so is knowing (ʿalīm) of such-and-such a matter.' As for 'ʿallām,' it does not come [applied] to such-and-such a matter, nor [is it said] 'ʿallām' absolutely. So if a person is described by that, restriction is necessary, [and] it is said: 'So-and-so is an all-knower (ʿallām) in such-and-such an art' -- and this is by way of [linguistic] expansion and [permissible] figure. And their saying 'So-and-so is an ʿallāma [a great savant]' is not of this kind, because that [form] is not a name of God; so it is not permissible to say that God is an 'ʿallāma.' So understand.
A grammatical-theological note on the divine names of knowing: al-ʿAlīm (intensive, self-related), al-ʿĀlim (active participle, act-related), al-ʿAllām (hyperbolic, both). Humans are normally called ʿālim; ʿalīm/ʿallām only with restriction (of a specific field). The intensive ʿallāma (savant) is pointedly NOT among God's names -- a small but precise point of divine-name discipline.
وكعلمِ أن العلمَ أقربُ الأوصاف إلى الحيّ، كما أن الحياة أقربُ الأوصاف إلى الذات. لأنّا قد بيّنا في الباب الذي قبل هذا أن وجودَ الشيء لنفسه حياتُه، وليس وجودُه غيرَ ذاته.
And [know,] as is known, that Knowledge is the nearest of the qualities to the Living, just as Life is the nearest of the qualities to the Essence. Because we have explained, in the chapter before this [Bāb 16], that the existence of a thing for itself is its life, and its existence is not other than its essence.
glossary: dhat
فلا شيءَ أقربُ إلى الذات من وصف الحياة، ولا شيءَ أقربُ إلى الحياة من العلم. لأن كل حيٍّ لا بد أن يعلم علماً ما.
So nothing is nearer to the Essence than the quality of Life, and nothing is nearer to Life than Knowledge. Because every living thing must know [by] some knowledge.
glossary: dhat
سواء كان إلهامياً، كعلم الحيوانات والهوامّ بما ينبغي لها وبما لا ينبغي، من المأكل والمسكن والحركة والسكون.
whether it be inspirational -- like the knowledge of the animals and the [crawling] vermin, of what is fitting for them and what is not fitting, of food, dwelling, motion, and rest.
فهذا العلمُ هو لازمٌ لكل حيّ، وإن كان بديهياً ضرورةً، أو تصديقياً، كعلم الإنسان والملائكة والجانّ. فحصل من هذا أن العلمَ أقربُ الأوصاف إلى الحياة.
So this knowledge is necessary for every living thing -- even if it be intuitive [/self-evident] of necessity, or assent-based [/discursive], like the knowledge of the human, the angels, and the jinn. So it results from this that Knowledge is the nearest of the qualities to Life.
ولهذا كنّى الله تعالى عن العلم بالحياة، فقال: {أَوَمَن كَانَ مَيْتاً فَأَحْيَيْنَاهُ} [الأنعام: 122]،
And for this, God (exalted is He) made [the word] 'life' a metonym for knowledge; [and] so He said: 'Is one who was dead, [and] We gave him life' (6:122, al-Anʿām) --
Qurʾān 6:122: al-Anʿām 6:122, opening clause; the witness numbers this clause '1 of al-Anʿām,' but it is part of the single verse 6:122 -- glossed clause-by-clause across §31-35
يعني جاهلاً فعلّمناه. {وَجَعَلْنَا لَهُ نُوراً يَمْشِي بِهِ فِي النَّاسِ} [الأنعام: 122]،
meaning [one who was] ignorant, [and] We taught him. 'And We made for him a light by which he walks among the people' (6:122, al-Anʿām) --
Qurʾān 6:122: al-Anʿām 6:122, second clause (witness 'verse 2')
أي: يفعل بمقتضى ذلك العلم. {كَمَن مَّثَلُهُ فِي الظُّلُمَاتِ} [الأنعام: 122]،
that is: he acts by the requirement of that knowledge. '[Is he] like one whose likeness is in the darknesses' (6:122, al-Anʿām) --
Qurʾān 6:122: al-Anʿām 6:122, third clause (witness 'verse 3')
يعني في ظلمة الطبيعة التي هي عينُ الجهل. {لَيْسَ بِخَارِجٍ مِّنْهَا} [الأنعام: 122]،
meaning, in the darkness of [created] nature, which is the very [reality of] ignorance. 'Not coming out of them' (6:122, al-Anʿām) --
Qurʾān 6:122: al-Anʿām 6:122, fourth clause (witness 'verse 4')
لأن الظلمةَ لا تهدي إلاَّ إلى الظلمة، فلا يُتوصَّل بالجهل إلى العلم -- أعني بالجهل الطبيعي -- ولا يمكن للجاهل أن يخرج من الجهل بالجهل. {كَذَلِكَ زُيِّنَ لِلْكَافِرِينَ مَا كَانُوا يَعْمَلُونَ} [الأنعام: 122]،
because the darkness guides only to the darkness; so [knowledge] is not reached by ignorance -- I mean, by the natural ignorance -- and it is not possible for the ignorant one to come out of ignorance by ignorance. 'Thus is made fair to the disbelievers what they used to do' (6:122, al-Anʿām) --
Qurʾān 6:122: al-Anʿām 6:122, fifth clause (witness 'verse 5'); all five clauses §31-35 are the one verse 6:122
أي: الساترين وجودَ الله تعالى بوجودهم. فلا يشهدون من أنفسهم ومن الموجودات سوى مخلوقيتها، فيسترون بذلك وجهَ الله، ويقولون: وصفُه أن لا يكون مخلوقاً، وأن لا يكون مسبوقاً بالعدم. ولم يشعروا أن الحقَّ سبحانه وتعالى، وإن ظهر في مخلوقاته، فإنما يظهر فيها بوصفه الذي يستحقه لنفسه.
that is, [to] the coverers [al-kāfirīn] of the existence of God (exalted is He) by their [own] existence. So they witness, of themselves and of the existents, nothing but their createdness; [and] so they cover, by that, the Face of God, and they say: 'His quality is that He not be created, and that He not be preceded by non-existence.' And they did not realize that the Real (glory be to Him, exalted is He), even though He appears in His creatures, appears in them only by His [own] quality which He deserves for Himself.
al-Jīlī plays on the root meaning of kāfir ('coverer'): the disbelievers are those who 'cover' God's existence with the creatures' existence -- seeing only createdness, and so veiling the Face of God. Their error is to think His appearing in the creatures would taint Him with createdness; rather (§37) He appears 'only by His own quality,' untouched by creaturely deficiency.
فلا يلحق به شيءٌ من نقائص المحدثات. وإن استند إليه شيءٌ من نقائص المحدثات، ظهر كمالُه في تلك النقائص،
So nothing of the deficiencies of the originated [things] attaches to Him. And if something of the deficiencies of the originated [things] leans upon Him, His perfection appears in those deficiencies,
فارتفع حكمُ النقص عنها، فكانت كاملةً باستنادها إليه. فلا يكون من الكامل إلاَّ ما هو كامل، ولا يستند إلى الكامل إلاَّ ما يلحق به النقص. وفي ذلك قال:
[and] so the rule of deficiency is lifted from them, [and] so they became perfect by their leaning upon Him. For there comes, from the Perfect, only what is perfect; and there leans upon the Perfect only what [otherwise] deficiency attaches to. And concerning that he said:
يُكمِّلُ نُقصانَ القَبيحِ جمالُه ....... إذا لاح فيه، فهو للقبحِ رافعُ
His beauty perfects the deficiency of the ugly; / when it gleams in it, it is the lifter of the ugliness.
ويرفعُ مقدارَ الوضيعِ جلالُه ....... فما ثَمَّ نقصانٌ، ولا ثَمَّ واضعُ
And His majesty raises the worth of the lowly; / so there is no deficiency there, and no [one] lowering [there].
ولما كان العلمُ لازماً للحياة، كما سبق، كانت الحياةُ أيضاً لازمةً للعلم، لاستحالة وجود عالِمٍ لا حياةَ له. وكلٌّ منهما لازمٌ ملزوم. وإذ قد عرفت هذا،
And since Knowledge is a necessary-concomitant of Life, as has preceded, Life too is a necessary-concomitant of Knowledge -- for the impossibility of the existence of a knower who has no life. And each of the two is [both] a concomitant and an entailer. And since you have [now] known this:
فقل: ما ثَمَّ لازمٌ ولا ملزوم، بالنظر إلى استقلال كل صفةٍ لله في نفسها. وإلاَّ لزم أن يكون بعضُ صفات الله مركَّباً من صفةٍ غيرها، أو من مجموع صفاته. وليس هو كذلك، تعالى الله عن ذلك علوّاً كبيراً.
then say: there is neither concomitant nor entailer there, by regard to the independence of each attribute of God in itself. Otherwise, it would follow that some of God's attributes be composed of [some] other attribute, or of the sum of His attributes -- and it is not so; exalted is God above that, a great exaltation!
glossary: sifat A subtle dialectic: at one consideration, Knowledge and Life mutually entail each other; but at the consideration of each attribute's independence in itself, there is no entailment at all -- else a divine attribute would be 'composed' of another, making it complex. al-Jīlī holds both, denying any composition in God.
فتقول مثلاً: صفةُ الخالقية غيرُ مركَّبةٍ من القدرة والإرادة والكلام، ولو كان المخلوقُ لا يوجد إلاَّ بهذه الصفات الثلاث؛ بل الصفةُ الخالقية صفةٌ لله تعالى واحدة.
So you say, for example: the attribute of Creator-ness is not composed of Power, Will, and Speech -- even though the creature is not brought into existence except by these three attributes; rather, the attribute of Creator-ness is a single attribute of God (exalted is He).
glossary: sifat
فهذه مستقلةٌ، غيرُ مركَّبةٍ من غيرها، ولا ملزومةٍ ولا لازمةٍ لسواها. وكذلك باقي الصفات، فليُتأمّل.
So this [attribute] is independent, not composed of [any] other, neither entailed-by nor entailing [any] other-than-it. And likewise the rest of the attributes. So let it be pondered.
glossary: sifat
وإذا صحّ هذا في حق الحق، فهو في حق الخلق أيضاً كذلك. لأنه سبحانه وتعالى خلق آدمَ على صورته، فلا بد أن يكون الإنسانُ نسخةً من كل صفةٍ من صفات الرحمن. فيوجد في الإنسان كلُّ ما يُنسب إلى الرحمن، حتى أنك تحكم للمحال بالوجوب بواسطة الإنسان. ألا تراك -- إذا فرضتَ مثلاً، كما تفرض للمحال، أن ثَمَّة حياً لا علمَ له، أو عالماً لا حياةَ له -- كان ذلك الحيُّ الذي لا علمَ له، أو العالِمُ الذي لا حياةَ له، موجوداً في عالم فرضك وخيالك، ومخلوقاً لربك؟
And if this is valid in the case of the Real, it is, in the case of the creation, likewise. Because He (glory be to Him, exalted is He) created Adam upon His form -- so the human must be a copy of every attribute of the attributes of the All-Merciful; [and] so there is found, in the human, everything that is ascribed to the All-Merciful -- so [much so] that you adjudge the impossible to be necessary, by means of the human. Do you not see [that], if you posit, for example -- as you posit for the impossible -- that there is a living thing with no knowledge, or a knower with no life, [then] that living thing with no knowledge, or that knower with no life, is existent in the world of your positing and your imagination, and [is] a created [thing] of your Lord?
glossary: khayal The human as the copy of all the divine attributes (from 'Adam upon His form,' sound, Bukhārī/Muslim) -- so much so that even the 'impossible' (a knower with no life) acquires a kind of existence through the human's imagination, which is itself a creation of God. This sets up the imaginal cosmology of §46-47.
إذ الخيالُ بما فيه مخلوقٌ لله تعالى، فوُجد في العالم -- بواسطة الإنسان -- ما كان متخيَّلَه في غيره.
since the imagination, with what is in it, is a created [thing] of God (exalted is He); [and] so there was found, in the world -- by means of the human -- what was [only] imagined of it in another.
glossary: khayal
واعلم أن المحسوسَ فرعٌ لعالم الخيال، إذ هو ملكوتُه. فما وُجد في الملكوت، لا بد أن يظهر في الملك منه -- بقدر القوابل والوقت والحال -- ما يكون نسخةً لذلك الموجود في الملكوت.
And know that the sensible is a branch of the world of imagination -- since it [imagination] is its dominion-realm (malakūt). So whatever is found in the dominion-realm must appear, in the kingdom (al-mulk), of it -- according to the [capacity of the] receptacles, the time, and the state -- [as] what is a copy of that [thing] existing in the dominion-realm.
glossary: khayal, mulk-malakut-jabarut The imaginal cosmology: the world of imagination (ʿālam al-khayāl / al-mithāl) is the malakūt (the inner, dominion-realm) of which the sensible world (al-mulk) is the outer 'branch' -- so that whatever is realized in the imaginal realm descends, as a copy, into the sensible, as the receptacles and conditions permit. This is the Akbarian doctrine of the intermediate imaginal world; al-Jīlī promises a fuller treatment (§50).
وتحت هذه الكلمات من الأسرار الإلهية ما لا يمكن شرحُه. فلا تهملها، فإنها مفاتيحُ للغيب، الذي إن صحّ بيدك،
And beneath these words are, of the divine secrets, what cannot be explained. So do not neglect them, for they are keys to the unseen -- which, if it is made sound in your hand,
فتحتَ بها أقفالَ الوجود جميعِه، أعلاه وأسفله.
you would open by them the locks of all existence -- its highest and its lowest.
وسيأتي الكلامُ على عالم الملكوت في محله من هذا الكتاب، إن شاء الله تعالى.
And the discourse on the dominion-realm (al-malakūt) will come, in its place in this book, if God (exalted is He) wills.
glossary: mulk-malakut-jabarut
فقل في العلم والحياة وغيرهما من الصفات، إن شئت بالتلازم، وإن شئت بعدمه.
So say, concerning Knowledge and Life and other than them of the attributes -- if you wish, by [their] mutual-entailment, and if you wish, by its absence.
glossary: sifat
وتوسّعْ في الجناب الإلهي، القائل على لسان نبيه: {إِنَّ أَرْضِي وَاسِعَةٌ فَإِيَّايَ فَاعْبُدُونِ} [العنكبوت: 56].
And expand [/range freely], in the divine Side -- the One who said, upon the tongue of His prophet: 'Truly My earth is vast, so worship Me [alone]' (29:56, al-ʿAnkabūt).
Qurʾān 29:56: al-ʿAnkabūt 29:56, the clause 'inna arḍī wāsiʿatun fa-iyyāya fa-ʿbudūn'
وقال رحمه الله تعالى في معنى ذلك:
And he (may God, exalted is He, have mercy on him) said, in the meaning of that:
عجبٌ لبحرٍ هاجَ في زخراتِه ....... متلاطمِ الأمواجِ في طفحاتِه
A wonder, for a sea [that] surged in its surgings, / its waves clashing, in its overflowings!
The closing sea-poem (§54-62) returns to al-Jīlī's standing figure of the Sea of the Essence (Bāb 2, Bāb 62): the seeker's 'ship of description' drowns in the Essence, and 'none is safe' -- the absolute annihilation of the knower in the known. 'Darknesses one above another' (§59) echoes al-Nūr 24:40.
من كلِّ رانٍ تهتوي أرياحُه ....... فيُقيمُ طودَ الموجِ في جنباتِه
From every [side] that overcasts, its winds rush down, / [and] so [the sea] raises up the mountain of the wave in its flanks.
والرعدُ فيه كأنه لتواترٍ ....... مثلُ الصدى للموجِ في زجراتِه
And the thunder in it -- as though, for [its] continuous succession, / [it were] like the echo to the wave, in its [loud] roarings.
والبرقُ يخطفُ كلَّ مقلةِ ناظرٍ ....... كالسيفِ يلمعُ في مدى هزّاتِه
And the lightning snatches away every eyeball of a beholder, / like the sword [that] gleams in the span of its brandishings.
والسحبُ تُركَمُ بعضُها في بعضِها ....... والمُزنُ تُمطِرُ من هواءِ صفحاتِه
And the clouds are heaped, one upon another; / and the rain-clouds pour down, from the air of its expanses.
ظلماتُ بعضٍ فوقَ بعضٍ قطرةٌ ....... مما حوى ذا البحرُ في ظلماتِه
Darknesses, one above another -- [each] a [single] drop / of what this sea has contained, in its darknesses.
كيف السلامةُ فيه للصبِّ الذي ....... غرقت مركبُ وصفِه في ذاتِه
How [can there be] safety in it, for the love-stricken one / whose ship of description has drowned in its essence?
أو كيف يصنعُ سابحٌ قُطعت ....... قوائمُه، ومن يقضي له بنجاتِه؟
Or how [can] a swimmer fare, whose / limbs have been cut off -- and who would decree, for him, his deliverance?
اللهُ أكبرُ ما بها من سالمٍ ....... هيهاتَ في هيهاتَ في هيهاتِه
God is greatest! There is, in it, no [one] safe -- / far off, [yet] in far off, [yet] in its far-off-ness!
Collation. Two-witness collated, staged 2026-06-03. Bāb 17 of the foundational opening band (al-ʿIlm, Knowledge) -- the second of the dedicated attribute-chapters. Witness-2 (ibnalarabi.com id=20) clean of navigation chrome; the trailing site-search widget EXCLUDED. Two embedded poems (8-verse opening qaṣīda §2-9; 9-verse sea-poem §54-62) and an interior 2-verse couplet (§39-40). Doctrinally notable for al-Jīlī's EXPLICIT correction of his master Ibn al-ʿArabī on the independence of divine knowledge (§11-20). The witness mis-numbers the five clauses of al-Anʿām 6:122 as 'verses 1-5 of al-Anʿām' (a clause-numbering quirk of the digital edition); all five are the single verse 6:122, corrected in the loci. Several kāf-as-alif OCR garbles restored. No lossy drop of authorial prose.
Qurʾān. Two loci verified verbatim against alquran.cloud, all tags correct on the surah: al-Anʿām 6:122, quoted in five interwoven clauses (§31-35) -- the witness numbers the clauses '1-5 of al-Anʿām,' but all five are the single verse 6:122 (the dead-given-life / light / darknesses verse); corrected. al-ʿAnkabūt 29:56 'inna arḍī wāsiʿatun fa-iyyāya fa-ʿbudūn' (§52). The two poems (§2-9, §54-62) and the couplet (§39-40) are al-Jīlī's own. 'God's self-sufficiency from the worlds' (§18) alludes to Āl ʿImrān 3:97 / al-ʿAnkabūt 29:6; 'Adam upon His form' (§45) is sound (Bukhārī/Muslim, cf. Bāb 4 §16).